Specification and negotiation in incomplete contracts
研究加州交通部采购拍卖中承包商对买方的讨价还价能力和敲竹杠问题，发现中标者谈判优势显著，平均敲竹杠占项目成本20%，且成本加成合同在72%项目中会降低买方剩余。
Abstract We investigate contractors' bargaining power and holdup on buyers in procurement auctions of incomplete contracts held by California Department of Transportation. Using a model where contractors bid competitively in response to a buyer's choice of initial contract design, we infer the contractors' costs and bargaining power from the bids and transfers negotiated after the auction. We find that the contract winners have substantial bargaining power in post‐auction negotiation. The average holdup on the buyer is about 20% of project costs. Counterfactual cost‐plus contracts would reduce the buyer's surplus in 72% of the projects, with an average reduction over $382,000.