Winners and Losers: the Distributional Effects of the French Feebate on the Automobile Market
量化了2008年法国新车环保税费政策对福利和环境的影响，发现政策使平均碳排放降低1.6%但增加了局部污染物排放，且对不同收入群体和地区有不同分配效应。
Abstract I quantify the welfare and environmental gains and losses from a policy establishing an environmental tax/subsidy for new cars in France in 2008. I estimate a structural model of demand and supply that features heterogeneity in consumer preferences to go beyond the average policy effects and analyse distributional aspects. The policy reduces average carbon emissions by 1.6% at the cost of additional emissions of local pollutants. The regulation favours middle-income individuals but has redistributive effects when combined with a tax that is proportional to income. Moreover, local pollutant emissions increase least in poor and rural areas, suggesting another redistribution channel.