Nash Equilibria on (Un)Stable Networks
研究个体在行为和朋友关系上同时决策的博弈模型，用k人共识动态排序均衡，并应用于青少年吸烟数据，发现朋友网络对价格变化的反应会放大控烟效果，学校种族融合降低吸烟率。
In response to a change, individuals may choose to follow the responses of their friends or, alternatively, to change their friends. To model these decisions, consider a game where players choose their behaviors and friendships. In equilibrium, players internalize the need for consensus in forming friendships and choose their optimal strategies on subsets of k players—a form of bounded rationality. The k ‐player consensual dynamic delivers a probabilistic ranking of a game's equilibria, and via a varying k , facilitates estimation of such games. Applying the model to adolescents' smoking suggests that: (a) the response of the friendship network to changes in tobacco price amplifies the intended effect of price changes on smoking, (b) racial desegregation of high schools decreases the overall smoking prevalence, (c) peer effect complementarities are substantially stronger between smokers compared to between nonsmokers.