Labor Regulations and the Cost of Corruption: Evidence from the Indian Firm Size Distribution
利用印度劳动法规仅适用于超过规模门槛的企业这一特点，通过企业规模分布扭曲和结构模型估计法规使单位劳动成本增加35%，并发现法规成本与腐败暴露正相关。
In this paper, we estimate the costs associated with an important suite of labor regulations in India by taking advantage of the fact that these regulations apply only to firms above a size threshold. Using distortions in the firm size distribution together with a structural model of firm size choice, we estimate that the regulations increase firms' unit labor costs by 35%. This estimate is robust to potential misreporting on the part of firms and enumerators. We also document a robust positive association between regulatory costs and exposure to corruption, which may explain why regulations appear to be so costly in developing countries.