Patent pools, vertical integration, and downstream competition
研究了专利池在多家许可方和非线性收费下对竞争制造商的影响，发现专利池的福利效应取决于行业结构：当整合制造商占比大时反竞争，否则促进竞争，并提出了无需信息即可筛查反竞争专利池的政策。
Abstract Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.