BARGAINING WITH OPTIMISM: IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION OF A MODEL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION
研究了谈判中因双方对最终结果信念不同而产生的乐观主义，利用佛罗里达州医疗事故诉讼数据估计了医生和患者的信念及潜在赔偿分布，发现伤害越严重患者越乐观、医生越悲观，并量化了赔偿上限对和解概率和金额的影响。
Abstract We study a model of bargaining with optimism where players have heterogeneous beliefs about the final resolution. Beliefs and bargaining surplus are identified from the settlement probability and the distribution of accepted transfers. Using data from medical malpractice lawsuits in Florida, we estimate doctor and patient beliefs and the distribution of potential compensation. We find that patients are more optimistic and doctors more pessimistic when the severity of injury is higher, and the joint optimism diminishes as severity increases. We quantify the increase in settlement probability and the reduction in accepted settlement offers under counterfactual caps on the total compensation.