DO HEALTH INSURERS CONTRACT THE BEST PROVIDERS? PROVIDER NETWORKS, QUALITY, AND COSTS
研究健康保险公司如何通过选择医疗服务提供者网络来传递质量信号，发现选择性签约偏向低成本提供者，而签约所有提供者则传递高质量信号，市场势力会削弱信号作用并导致低质量和低效率。
Abstract We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health‐care sector. Two health‐care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low‐cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereby leading to lower quality and inefficiency.