Common Ownership in America: 1980–2017
利用1980至2017年标普500公司数据，实证检验共同所有权假说，发现其上升主要由指数化和分散化驱动，并指出该理论预测了通过隧道行为侵占未分散股东利益的激励。
We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm.