Suddenly Married
利用2013年美国最高法院温莎案带来的联邦同性婚姻承认的税收变化，估计联合征税的劳动供给效应和效率成本，发现联合征税比个人征税效率更低、税收收入更少。
<h3>Abstract</h3> Joint taxation can exacerbate the deadweight loss of taxation due to labor supply responses, but evidence is scarce. I estimate the labor supply effects and efficiency costs of joint taxation in the United States by leveraging tax variation created by federal same-sex marriage recognition following the 2013 <i>United States v. Windsor</i> Supreme Court ruling. I estimate significant compensated elasticities along the extensive, but not intensive, margin among both higher and lower earners. My findings suggest that joint taxation is less efficient and generates less tax revenue than individual taxation, and that lowering tax rates for secondary earners could improve efficiency.