Paying for efficiency: Incentivising same-day discharges in the English NHS
研究英国NHS对同日出院给予更高定价的激励政策，发现对32种疾病中的14种有显著正向效果，计划性疾病的弹性中位数为0.24，急诊为0.01。
We study a pay-for-efficiency scheme that encourages hospitals to admit and discharge patients on the same calendar day when clinically appropriate. Since 2010, hospitals in the English NHS are incentivised by a higher price for patients treated as same-day discharge than for overnight stays, despite the former being less costly. We analyse administrative data for patients treated during 2006-2014 for 191 conditions for which same-day discharge is clinically appropriate - of which 32 are incentivised. Using difference-in-difference and synthetic control methods, we find that the policy had generally a positive impact with a statistically significant effect in 14 out of the 32 conditions. The median elasticity is 0.24 for planned and 0.01 for emergency conditions. Condition-specific design features explain some, but not all, of the differential responses.