Fiscal interactions in the short and the long run: evidence from German reunification
利用德国统一这一准实验，研究东德城镇在统一后是否模仿西德邻镇的营业税和财产税率，发现营业税存在短期模仿但长期消失，财产税则无互动。
Abstract This paper uses the quasi-experiment of Germany’s reunification to test for strategic interactions in local taxation. After reunification, East-German municipalities were allowed to choose, for the first time in decades, local business and property tax rates. I explore whether the tax rates they chose were influenced by the tax rates in adjacent West-German municipalities. The results show that East-German municipalities mimicked the business tax rates of their western neighbors immediately after reunification, but not in later years. I find no evidence for interactions in property tax rates. These results are broadly consistent with models of social learning in fiscal policy.