Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
研究了共同价值环境下收益最大化的拍卖机制，发现最优方案是设定一个固定价格或向低信号竞拍者倾斜分配，从而将赢家诅咒转化为赢家祝福，提升卖方收益。
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of the bidders' independent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with probability 1, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, namely, the highest price such that every type of every bidder is willing to buy the object. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than 1, then optimal mechanisms skew the allocation toward bidders with lower signals. The resulting allocation induces a “winner's blessing,” whereby the expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first‐price, second‐price, or English auctions) deliver lower revenue because of the winner's curse generated by the allocation. Our qualitative results extend to more general common value environments with a strong winner's curse.