Does Regulatory Jurisdiction Affect the Quality of Investment-Adviser Regulation?
研究发现，将中型投资顾问的监管权从SEC移交给州监管机构后，客户投诉增加了30%至40%，且更多涉及信义义务违规，尤其在资源较少的州。
The Dodd-Frank Act shifted regulatory jurisdiction over “ midsize” investment advisers from the SEC to state-securities regulators. Client complaints against midsize advisers increased relative to those continuing under SEC oversight by 30 to 40 percent of the unconditional probability. Complaints increasingly cited fiduciary violations and rose more where state regulators had fewer resources. Advisers responding more to weaker oversight had past complaints, were located farther from regulators, faced less competition, had more conflicts of interest, and served primarily less-sophisticated clients. Our results inform optimal regulatory design in markets with informational asymmetries and search frictions.