Inefficient Credit Booms
研究存在金融摩擦的经济中竞争均衡的福利性质，发现金融合同可能导致事前过度借贷和事后过度波动，产生低效的信贷繁荣，为评估预防性政策提供框架。
This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with financial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive financial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. Even though, from a first-best perspective the equilibrium always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise. The inefficiency is due to the combination of limited commitment in financial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a financial crisis.