Interpersonal Bundling
研究垄断企业如何通过设置团体购买折扣（即人际捆绑）来应对需求不确定性，发现这种策略往往能实现最高利润，并分析了最优设计和实施中的战略问题。
This paper studies a model of interpersonal bundling, in which a monopolist offers a good for sale under a regular price and a group purchase discount if the number of consumers in a group—the bundle size—belongs to some menu of intervals. We find that this is often a profitable selling strategy in response to demand uncertainty, and it can achieve the highest profit among all possible selling mechanisms. We explain how the profitability of interpersonal bundling with a minimum or maximum group size may depend on the nature of uncertainty and on parameters of the market environment, and we discuss strategic issues related to the optimal design and implementation of these bundling schemes. Our analysis sheds light on popular marketing practices such as group purchase discounts, and it offers insights on potential new marketing innovation. This paper was accepted by J. Miguel Villas-Boas, marketing.