Behavioral Contract Design Under Asymmetric Forecast Information
通过实验室实验研究供应商在买方拥有私有预测信息时的产能投资决策，发现有限理性和公平偏好损害供应链绩效，并测试了考虑这些行为因素的契约设计。
ABSTRACT We investigate the capacity investment decision of a supplier who produces a critical component for a buyer. An incentive conflict is present, because the buyer possesses private forecast information about end customer demand. We use laboratory experiments to test the performance of nonlinear capacity reservation contracts offered by the supplier. We show that both bounded rationality and fairness preferences consistently lead to buyer contract choices that harm supplier performance and overall supply chain performance. We therefore examine several capacity reservation contracts that take into account the buyer's inability to maximize utility (bounded rationality) and/or the buyer's motives (inequity aversion). We find that considering these behavioral aspects in contract design enhances supply chain performance.