Demand and Supply of Infrequent Payments as a Commitment Device: Evidence from Kenya
研究了肯尼亚奶农为获得不频繁支付（作为储蓄承诺工具）而愿意承担高额成本的现象，并发现合同执行不力限制了买方在提供不频繁支付方面的竞争。
Despite extensive evidence that preferences are often time-inconsistent, there is only scarce evidence of willingness to pay for commitment. Infrequent payments for frequently provided goods and services are a common feature of many markets and they may naturally provide commitment to save for lumpy expenses. Multiple experiments in the Kenyan dairy sector show that: (i) farmers are willing to incur sizable costs to receive infrequent payments as a commitment device, (ii) poor contract enforcement, however, limits competition among buyers in the supply of infrequent payments. We then present a model of demand and supply of infrequent payments and test its additional predictions.