Fiscal Capacity and Dualism in Colonial States: The French Empire 1830–1962
利用档案数据构建了法兰西第二殖民帝国（1830-1962）的新数据集，发现殖民国家虽征收大量税收，但因公共支出工资成本高而行政不足，即使在发展主义时期财政能力大增和海外补贴巨大时，这一约束依然存在。
What was the capacity of European colonial states? How fiscally extractive were they? What was their capacity to provide public goods and services? And did this change in the “developmentalist” era of colonialism? To answer these questions, we use archival sources to build a new dataset on colonial states of the second French colonial empire (1830–1962). French colonial states extracted a substantial amount of revenue, but they were under-administered because public expenditure entailed high wage costs. These costs remained a strong constraint in the “developmentalist” era of colonialism, despite a dramatic increase in fiscal capacity and large overseas subsidies.