腐败的选票与规则遵守

Corrupted Votes and Rule Compliance

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics · 2024
被引 0
人大 AABS 3

中文导读

通过在线实验发现,选举中的买票或剥夺选民资格会降低人们对多数票通过规则的遵守意愿,其负面影响与完全取消选举相当。

Abstract

Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which participants distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less likely to voluntarily comply with a rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes impacts economic behavior and sheds light on factors that may underlie “rule legitimacy.”

选举舞弊投票违规规则遵从实验经济学