Debt restructuring with multiple bank relationships
研究了当企业债务分散时，银行间通过重复博弈中的惩罚机制促进债务重组，发现银行数量增加会先提高重组概率，超过阈值后协调问题占主导。
When the debt of firms in distress is dispersed, a restructuring agreement may be difficult to reach because of free riding. We develop a repeated game in which banks come across each other frequently, and can threaten a punishment in case of free riding. As the number of lending banks grows, the chance of meeting again a bank and of being punished for free riding increases, improving the likelihood of cooperation. Looking at Italian firms in distress, we find that the estimated restructuring probability, as well as the probability of a positive outcome of financial distress, increases with the number of banks up to a threshold beyond which coordination problems prevail.