Occupy government: Democracy and the dynamics of personnel decisions and public finances
研究巴西再民主化以来城市中的庇护主义（政治任命）的原因和后果，发现获胜政党成员在政府雇员中的比例和工资份额显著增加，联邦转移支付和问责缺失是重要驱动因素。
This work investigates causes and consequences of patronage in Brazilian cities since the country’s re-democratization. It uses five election cycles and compares the hiring of winning and losing party members in close elections to causally estimate patronage. Cities increase their shares of civil servants affiliated with winning political coalitions by 3 percentage points during a mayoral term, and also increase their wage shares by 4 percentage points. Overall, patronage explains slightly more than 50% of the large increase in politically affiliated public employees since re-democratization. Moreover, we find that federal transfers and lack of accountability are important determinants of patronage.