Lending Cycles and Real Outcomes: Costs of Political Misalignment
研究发现土耳其国有银行在地方选举前后系统性地调整贷款，反对派地区的企业面临信贷约束，导致资产、就业和销售下降，并因资源错配降低整体生产率。
Abstract We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and political alignment of incumbent mayors. This effect only exists in corporate lending and creates credit constraints for firms in opposition areas, which suffer drops in assets, employment and sales but not firm entry. Financial resources and factors of production are misallocated as more efficient provinces and industries suffer the greatest constraints, reducing aggregate productivity.