Venture Capital and Capital Allocation
研究发现，风险投资家为建立声誉而避免支持低价值企业，这能缓解信息摩擦、帮助公司上市，但也可能减少对优质企业的投资，从而在优质企业充裕时降低社会福利。
ABSTRACT I show that venture capitalists' motivation to build reputation can have beneficial effects in the primary market, mitigating information frictions and helping firms go public. Because uninformed reputation‐motivated venture capitalists want to appear informed, they are biased against backing firms—by not backing firms, they avoid taking low‐value firms to market, which would ultimately reveal their lack of information. In equilibrium, reputation‐motivated venture capitalists back relatively few bad firms, creating a certification effect that mitigates information frictions. However, they also back relatively few good firms, and thus, reputation motivation decreases welfare when good firms are abundant or profitable.