Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium
研究了当公民可以通过成本高昂的信息搜索来缓解信息问题时，政治均衡如何变化，发现政治租金分布与信息搜索成本呈倒U型关系，且选举制度越比例化，投票率越低、租金越高。
Political parties commited to grab rents may run for election, and even win, if citizens are uninformed. But, how is the political equilibrium affected if citizens can mitigate this information problem through costly information search? We propose a political equilibrium theory with endogenous information search and turnout. We show that: (i) the political equilibrium generates political uncertainty characterized by a distribution of rent policies; (ii) the expectation of this rent distribution is inversely U-shaped in the information search cost; (iii) turnout is lower and rents are higher the more proportional is the electoral system.