Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire
实验发现，降低客户获取信息的成本会减少顾问的亲社会行为，因为客户本可避免事后失望，导致内疚的因果归责从顾问转向客户。
We study strategic communication between a customer and an advisor who is privately informed about the most suitable choice for the customer but whose preferences are misaligned with the customer’s preferences. The advisor sends a message to the customer who, in turn, can secure herself from bad advice by acquiring costly information on her own. In our experiments, we find that making the customer’s information acquisition less costly leads to less prosocial behavior of the advisor. This can be explained by a model of shared guilt, which predicts a shift in causal attribution of guilt from the advisor to the customer if the latter could have avoided her ex post disappointment. We conclude that providing better access to information through, for example, consumer protection regulation or digital information aggregation and dissemination, may have unintended negative consequences on peoples’ willingness to take responsibility for each other. Data files and the online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3101 . This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.