Market Evidence on Investor Preference for Fewer Directorships
通过测量市场对忙碌董事从仍保留其职位的公司辞职的反应，发现投资者偏好董事兼任更少董事会，且该反应在董事服务需求更大、辞职释放更多时间或董事质量更高时更积极。
We examine investors’ preference for directors serving on fewer versus more boards (“busy directors”) by measuring market reaction to busy directors’ resignations at the companies that still keep these directors on the board. We find a positive reaction implying a preference for fewer directorships. The reaction is more positive when the need for the director’s services is greater, when the resignation frees up more of the director’s time, and when the director is of higher quality. Furthermore, we find that following their resignation, directors increase their board responsibilities/leadership at firms that still retain them and seek no board appointments elsewhere.