Multiple-Purchaser Payments for Ecosystem Services: An Exploration Using Spatial Simulation Modelling
通过空间模拟模型，研究了当多个受益群体可能为生态系统服务付费时，协商能否比非合作策略带来帕累托改进，并发现该结果仅在特定条件下成立。
This paper focuses on the issue of payments for ecosystem services (PES) mechanism design when the activity incentivised through the scheme benefits multiple groups, each of whom might be prepared to contribute to payments made through the scheme. In particular, we examine spatial coordination on the demand side of the market; that is to say, the question of which beneficiary of the PES scheme buys land-management changes on which land parcels. We show through spatial simulation modelling that it is possible for negotiation to lead to Pareto improvements when compared to solutions reached through non-cooperative strategic solutions; however, we also show that this result is not universal and only holds under certain conditions. In particular, the spatial correlation and spatial interdependence of the ecosystem service benefits are key in determining whether negotiation between beneficiaries is optimal and therefore if policy makers and designers of PES schemes should be prioritising bringing together multiple beneficiaries of ecosystem services.