Auctions in near-continuous time
在近连续时间环境中，通过可图形调整的投标函数，发现第一价格与荷兰式拍卖、第二价格与英式拍卖在行为上同构，并质疑风险厌恶的传统解释，提出投标者是对观察到的价格分布做出最优反应。
Abstract The lack of a behavioral isomorphism between theoretically equivalent auction institutions is a robust finding in experimental economics. Using a near-continuous time environment and graphically adjustable bid functions, we are able to provide subjects with extensive feedback in multiple auction formats. We find that (1) First Price and Dutch Clock auctions are behaviorally isomorphic and (2) Second Price and English Clock auctions are behaviorally isomorphic. We further replicate the established result (1) that prices in Dutch Clock auctions exceed those of English Clock auctions and (2) that prices in First Price auctions exceed those of Second Price auctions. The latter pattern is often attributed to risk aversion which changes the equilibrium bidding strategy for First Price and Dutch Clock auctions. Because we observe each participant’s bid function directly, we find evidence suggesting a different explanation, namely that bidders are best responding to the distribution of observed prices.