International Mergers and Acquisitions Laws, the Market for Corporate Control, and Accounting Conservatism
利用各国并购法颁布作为外部冲击，研究发现并购法通过增强公司控制权市场威胁，促使企业提高会计稳健性，尤其在股东保护弱和并购活动增长快的国家更显著。
ABSTRACT Exploiting the staggered enactment of country‐level mergers and acquisitions (M&A) law as an exogenous increase in corporate takeover threat, this paper examines how a disciplinary market for corporate control affects accounting conservatism. Following M&A law adoption, we find increased accounting conservatism, with more pronounced effects in countries with weak shareholder protection and in those experiencing larger growth in takeover activity. Further analysis reveals that elevated takeover threats increase conservatism through changes in capital structure and investment decisions as well as improvements in board monitoring. Our findings highlight the importance of the market for corporate control in shaping financial‐reporting outcome.