Imperfect Competition in Firm-to-Firm Trade
利用比利时企业间销售关系数据，发现企业加成率随买方平均投入份额上升而上升，并构建模型估计买方-供应商特定加成率，发现禁止价格歧视可使总福利提升约6%。
Abstract This paper studies the implications of imperfect competition in firm-to-firm trade. Exploiting data on the universe of sales relationships between Belgian firms, we document that firms’ markups increase in the average input shares among their buyers. Motivated by this fact, we develop and estimate a model where firms charge buyer–supplier-specific markups that depend on the bilateral input shares. We find markup dispersion within firms across buyers creates substantial welfare loss: Aggregate welfare increases by around 6% when firms are banned from charging different markups across buyers.