Market Power and Income Taxation
在多部门、异质性能力、内生劳动供给和非线性所得税的模型中，分析市场势力与不平等问题，发现比例加价无影响，非比例加价的福利效应取决于其与加权平均值的比较，且最优政策规则在考虑分配和劳动供给扭曲时仍最大化消费者与生产者剩余。
This article analyzes concerns about market power and inequality in a model with multiple sectors, heterogeneous abilities, endogenous labor supply, and nonlinear income taxation. Proportional markups with no profit dissipation have no effect on the economy, and a policy that reduces a nonproportional markup raises (lowers) welfare when it is higher (lower) than a weighted average of other markups. With proportional (partial or full) profit dissipation, proportional markups are equivalent to a downward shift of the distribution of abilities, and the optimal policy rule with nonproportional markups maximizes consumer plus producer surplus despite concerns for distribution and labor supply distortion.