Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital
研究了风险厌恶的企业家因无法无限期承诺其人力资本而面临的融资约束，以及这对债务容量、投资和薪酬的影响，发现企业家净财富对异质性风险过度暴露而对系统性风险暴露不足。
ABSTRACT A risk‐averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which limits the firm's debt capacity, distorts investment and compensation, and constrains the entrepreneur's risk sharing. This puts dynamic liquidity and state‐contingent risk allocation at the center of corporate financial management. The firm balances mean‐variance investment efficiency and the preservation of financial slack. We show that in general the entrepreneur's net worth is overexposed to idiosyncratic risk and underexposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the closer the firm is to exhausting its debt capacity.