Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica
通过哥斯达黎加的随机实验，发现可信的执法邮件使先前未申报的注册企业纳税率提高3.4个百分点，金额增加15美元，且效果持续两年，有助于未来税收执法。
The majority of firms in developing countries are informal, yet even among registered firms, tax filing rates are low. We argue that non-filing of taxes among registered firms constitutes an important intermediate form of informality, which can be tackled cost-effectively. Using a randomized experiment in Costa Rica, we show that credible enforcement emails increased the tax payment rate (amount) by 3.4 p.p. (US$15) among previously non-filing firms. Emails that highlight third-party reports of a firm’s transactions further increased compliance. The effect persisted over two years, and treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, facilitating future tax enforcement.