Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors
研究企业如何设计最优融资方案，从不同规模的投资者处筹集资本，发现大投资者获得更高净回报，且投资者规模差异越大企业收益越高，揭示了战略风险可能加剧不平等。
A firm raises capital from multiple investors to fund a project. The project succeeds only if the capital raised exceeds a stochastic threshold, and the firm offers payments contingent on success. We study the firm’s optimal unique-implementation scheme, namely the scheme that guarantees the firm the maximum payoff. This scheme treats investors differently based on size. We show that if the distribution of the investment threshold is log-concave, larger investors receive higher net returns than smaller investors. Moreover, higher dispersion in investor size increases the firm’s payoff. Our analysis highlights strategic risk as an important potential driver of inequality.