Simulating mergers in a vertical supply chain with bargaining
构建了一个上游纳什议价、下游企业进行价格或拍卖竞争的两层供应链模型，并用数值模拟分析纵向结构对合并效果的影响，最后以Anthem/Cigna合并案为例展示模型应用。
Abstract We model a two‐level supply chain where Nash bargaining occurs upstream and firms compete in a logit setting downstream, either via Bertrand price setting or an auction. The parameters can be calibrated with a discrete set of data on prices, margins, and market shares, facilitating use by antitrust practitioners. We perform numerical simulations to identify cases where modelling the full vertical structure is important and where harm is likely. We also examine the thwarted Anthem/Cigna merger and show how the model weighs the various arguments made by the government and the defendants.