Within‐syndicate conflicts, loan covenants, and syndicate formation
研究银团贷款中参与银行与牵头行之间的利益冲突如何影响贷款契约条款和银团结构，发现更严格的契约有助于缓解内部冲突，而利益一致时契约限制较少。
Abstract We study how conflicts within a lending syndicate affect loan contract and syndicate formation. We argue that loan provisions serve an important dual function: In addition to moderating borrower–lender conflicts, they reduce within‐syndicate conflicts. We show that greater potential for within‐syndicate conflicts is associated with more and stricter covenants. Loans are less restrictive when the interests of participants and the lead arrangers are better aligned, for example, when participant–banks have stronger relationships with the lead arranger or hold borrower's equity (indirectly). Overall, our results show that covenant choice, syndicate formation, and lead arranger's loan allocation all play an important role in reducing within‐syndicate conflicts.