On Information Design in Games
研究了博弈中信息提供如何通过影响参与者的信念来改变行为，描述了最优信念分布的结构，包括一个凹包络表示，并用于计算对抗性均衡选择下的最优信息结构。
Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents’ beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents’ beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.