Cancellable Insider Trading Plans: An Analysis of SEC Rule 10b5-1*
研究SEC规则10b5-1允许内幕人士提前规划交易的影响，发现该规则在信息不对称足够大时能改善内幕人士和外部投资者的福利，但取消选择性终止条款可能带来更大福利提升。
Abstract Rule 10b5-1 enables insiders to preplan future trades before becoming informed. Within a strategic rational expectations equilibrium framework, I characterize an insider’s unique optimal trading plan, which balances portfolio diversification against exploitation of the rule’s selective termination option. Because the rule reduces adverse selection and provides insurance against bad outcomes, the rule generally improves welfare for both the insider, who later becomes informed, and uninformed outsiders, provided there exists a sufficient degree of information asymmetry. Eliminating the rule’s selective termination option results in an even greater welfare improvement under a large subset of parametric conditions. Received March 9, 2018; editorial decision January 11, 2019 by Editor Wei Jiang.