How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*
研究政府应否将公共基础设施的建设与运营捆绑为公私合作，还是分开招标，取决于创新性质，捆绑可能刺激或抑制投资，且若无法防止重新谈判，公私合作可能导致政府故意选择技术落后的项目。
Abstract The government wants an infrastructure‐based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public–private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement (i.e., delegate the tasks to different firms)? Each task entails unobservable investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that, depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling can either stimulate or discourage investments. Moreover, we find that if renegotiation cannot be prevented, public–private partnerships might lead the government to deliberately opt for technologically inferior projects.