A Financial Accelerator through Coordination Failure
研究短期债务市场中流动性危机对宏观经济的影响，发现债权人基于不完美信号和他人行为的预期做出展期决策，导致协调失灵和流动性溢价，杠杆放大该低效，流动性冲击引发产出大幅收缩。
Abstract This article studies the effect of liquidity crises in short-term debt markets in a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Creditors (retail banks) receive imperfect signals regarding the profitability of borrowers (wholesale banks) and, based on these signals and their beliefs about other creditors’ actions, choose whether to roll over funding, or not. The unco-ordinated actions of creditors cause a suboptimal incidence of rollover, generating an illiquidity premium. Leverage magnifies this co-ordination inefficiency. Illiquidity shocks in credit markets result in sharp contractions in output. Policy responses are analysed.