Dynamic Tax Evasion with Habit Formation in Consumption*
研究在消费受习惯驱动的情况下，个人如何跨期决策逃税和消费，发现习惯形成会抑制逃税，且重罚比频繁检查更有效。
Abstract We model the optimal intertemporal decision of an agent who chooses tax evasion and consumption, over an infinite lifetime horizon, where consumption is driven by habits. We find the following: (i) tax evaders reduce consumption in the early stages of habit accumulation and increase it over time; (ii) habit formation has a dampening effect on tax evasion; (iii) neglecting tax evasion can lead to habit overestimation; (iv) the effect of the tax rate on tax evasion is ambiguous; (v) heavy fines are more efficient than frequent controls in reducing tax evasion.