Prize-linked savings games: Theory and experiment
研究了一种有奖储蓄游戏，参与者可将资金存入有奖储蓄账户，随机抽取一人获得固定奖金。理论和实验均发现引入有奖储蓄会减少常规储蓄，但实验显示总储蓄增加，且随人均奖金提高而上升。
We introduce a game in which each player can allocate her endowment in a prize-linked savings (PLS) account, which awards a fixed prize only to a randomly chosen winner. Like Tullock's contest, the probability for each player of winning the prize is the ratio of her PLS deposit to the total deposits made by all participating players. We derive a unique equilibrium and further examine the effects of introducing PLS as an alternative savings option to standard savings (SS), which yields a fixed rate of return. Both theory and experiment agree that introducing PLS lowers each participant's SS amount. While the theory suggests that the effect of introducing PLS on total savings (SS+PLS) is ambiguous, we find in the laboratory that the effect is positive and significant. By varying the PLS prize and group size, both PLS and total savings increase as the average PLS prize per subject increases.