Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits
通过实验研究决策者面临激励时如何替他人承担风险，发现人们对此类激励反应强烈且较少顾及利益相关者，但人格特质可缓解这一倾向。
Abstract Decision‐makers often face incentives to increase risk‐taking on behalf of others (e.g., they are offered bonus contracts and contracts based on relative performance). We conduct an experimental study of risk‐taking on behalf of others using a large heterogeneous sample, and we find that people respond to such incentives without much apparent concern for stakeholders. Responses are heterogeneous and mitigated by personality traits. The findings suggest that a lack of concern for others’ risk exposure hardly requires “financial psychopaths” in order to flourish, but it is diminished by social concerns.