The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
研究发送者如何通过披露项目质量信息来说服接收者接受项目，发现最优机制呈嵌套区间结构，即更乐观的接收者类型对应的接受质量区间包含更不乐观的类型，并给出求解算法。
A sender persuades a receiver to accept a project by disclosing information about a payoff‐relevant quality. The receiver has private information about the quality, referred to as his type. We show that the sender‐optimal mechanism takes the form of nested intervals: each type accepts on an interval of qualities and a more optimistic type's interval contains a less optimistic type's interval. This nested‐interval structure offers a simple algorithm to solve for the optimal disclosure and connects our problem to the monopoly screening problem. The mechanism is optimal even if the sender conditions the disclosure mechanism on the receiver's reported type.