Pretrial negotiations under optimism
构建了一个审前谈判模型，假设双方对法官判决持乐观态度，并预期审判前可能获得案件公开信息。研究发现，信息到达时双方会立即和解，但信息到达前也可能达成和解，且和解时机取决于乐观程度，匹配了典型事实。
Abstract We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect—settling at a particular date before the deadline, a strong deadline effect—settling at the deadline, or impasse, depending on the level of optimism. Our findings match stylized facts.