SEQUENTIAL EXPERT ADVICE: SUPERIORITY OF CLOSED‐DOOR MEETINGS
研究了两位关心职业声誉的专家依次向贝叶斯决策者提供建议，发现保密优于透明，能使决策者获得更优结果，且保密让后行动的专家更易发挥关键作用。
Abstract Two career‐concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker ( D ). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D . Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist.