CEO investment of deferred compensation plans and firm performance
研究了美国CEO如何根据公司盈利状况投资其递延薪酬计划，发现CEO在好时期将递延薪酬大量投资于公司股权，在坏时期则撤资，这可能削弱递延薪酬的激励对齐效果。
Abstract We study how US chief executive officers (CEOs) invest their deferred compensation plans depending on the firm's profitability. By looking at the correlation between the CEO's return on these plans and the firm's stock return, we show that deferred compensation is to a large extent invested in the company equity in good times and divested from it in bad times. The divestment from company equity in bad times arguably reflects CEOs' incentive to abandon the firm and to invest in alternative instruments to preserve the value of their deferred compensation plans. This result suggests that the incentive alignment effects of deferred compensation crucially depend on the firm's health status.