The Pecking Order of Segmentation and Liquidity-Injection Policies in a Model of Contagious Crises
研究了两国模型中杠杆投资者引发甩卖外部性导致金融危机和传染，政府通过注入公共流动性和分割流动性市场来应对，发现分割是次优措施，仅在税收能力限制流动性注入时使用，且不应限制私人流动性自由流动。
Abstract We study a two-country setting in which leveraged investors generate fire-sale externalities, leading to financial crises and contagion. Governments can affect the incidence of financial crisis and the degree of contagion by injecting public liquidity and, additionally, by segmenting the countries’ liquidity markets. We show that segmentation allows a country to avoid contagion and fend off mild financial crises caused by a small shock to its liquidity demand, at the cost of exposing it to more severe financial crises caused by a large shock. We derive a “pecking order” result, whereby segmentation is a second-best measure that coordinated governments should use only when tax capacity constrains them from injecting liquidity. Even when segmentation is welfare-enhancing, it should be applied to public liquidity alone, never restricting the free flow of private liquidity across countries. Uncoordinated governments tend to use segmentation excessively.