RATIONAL DISINHIBITION AND EXTERNALITIES IN PREVENTION
研究理性个体通过预防行为控制感染风险的模型，比较分散决策与社会最优结果，发现个体过度暴露导致疾病流行率偏高，并分析暴露前预防的福利效应。
Abstract This article studies a model of disease propagation in which rational and forward‐looking individuals can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive behavior. Equilibrium outcomes under decentralized decision making are characterized and contrasted to the outcomes chosen by a social planner. In general, individuals overexpose themselves to infection, leading to suboptimally high disease prevalence. The model is applied to study the welfare effects of preexposure prophylaxis, which reduces transmission between serodiscordant couples and causes disinhibition. It is shown that a decrease in the induced infection risks increases disease prevalence and can lead to decreases in overall welfare.