Price Setting on a Network
研究了相互关联的垄断者网络中的定价问题，发现网络中的战略互动加剧了多重边际化问题，个体利润与一种新的网络中心性度量成正比，强调了网络结构在合并或贸易政策中的重要性。
ABSTRACT I study price setting within a network of interconnected monopolists. Some firms possess stronger commitment or bargaining power than others, enabling them to influence the pricing decisions of other firms. Although it is well‐understood that multiple marginalization reduces both total profits and social welfare, I show that strategic interactions within the network exacerbate the marginalization problem. Individual profits are proportional to a new measure of network centrality, defined by the equilibrium characterization. The results underscore the importance of network structure in policy considerations, such as mergers or trade policies.